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1 Introduction
This paper examines implications of product market competition on patenting, knowledge
spillover, innovation profits and R&D expenditure. Developing a simple two period model of
in-house innovation with endogenous knowledge spillover due to scientist mobility, wherein
an entrepreneur first innovates a technology and then produces and sells a final good, it
demonstrates the following. First, patenting propensity has a non-monotone relation with
product market competition intensity. Second, scientist mobility has a monotone relation
with competition. Third, the innovation’s total profitability and R&D expenditure have
non-monotone relations with competition intensity. Fourth, increase in patent strength
decreases the innovation’s profitability and increases R&D expenditure when product market
competition intensity is moderately low, and has no effect otherwise. The results suggest
important considerations for patent reforms, not just in their effect on innovation, but also
in their interaction with potential product market competition.
In our model of innovation, the entrepreneur requires a scientist’s aid only during the
development of the new technology. Therefore, during the commercialization phase of the
project, the scientist may join or establish a rival enterprise in the product market. In the
spirit of Pakes and Nitzan (1983), we suppose knowledge spillover to be endogenous in
that the entrepreneur can influence labor mobility through her second period wage offer.
Further, following Kim and Marschke (2005), we allow the entrepreneur to use patents
to protect the innovation against infringement. A differentiating feature in our paper is
that we introduce within this framework of mobility and innovation, an explicit model
of product market competition á la Hotelling, to analyze the significance of competition
intensity on innovation attributes and effectiveness of patent reforms. For this purpose, we
first examine the relationships of patenting, mobility, innovation incentives and investment
in R&D with the intensity of product market competition. Next, we study the effect of
increase in patent strength on these relationships and accordingly identify its implications
at different levels of competition intensity.
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We find, as competition intensity in the product market increases, the entrepreneur initiates
patenting beyond a lower threshold of competition intensity but terminates it beyond a higher
threshold, implying a non-monotone relation of patenting propensity with product market
competition intensity. However, higher potential competition ceases movement beyond a
threshold, implying a monotone relation between competition intensity and scientist mobility.
The innovation’s profitability decreases as long as movement occurs and increases henceforth,
implying a non-monotone trend of innovation incentive with competition intensity. On
the contrary, R&D expenditure increases while movement occurs but stabilizes thereafter,
also carving a non-monotone trend with competitive pressure. Our results conform to the
existing literature, which extensively documents non-monotone relationships of competition
intensity with innovation attributes such as patenting activity (Aghion et al., 2005), value
of innovation (Boone, 2001) and total R&D expenditure (Houngbonon & Jeanjean, 2016;
Sacco & Schmutzler, 2011; Tishler & Milstein, 2009). However, the specific relationships
in our model are determined by the difference in equilibrium knowledge spillover due to
scientist mobility at different levels of competition intensity.
As the patent regime is tightened, any potential benefit to the entrepreneur due to greater
expected reparation is neutralized through an equal increase in the scientist’s joining wage,
to ensure successful launch of the innovation. Thus, stronger patents reduce expected
innovation profitability through higher costs from increased patenting when scientist mobility
drives knowledge spillover. Further, they augment expected R&D expenditure by requiring
higher scientist wage. Our analysis of market competition reveals that these expected effects
manifest only when product market competition intensity is moderate, not otherwise. The
reason is, at very low competition stronger patents fail to induce patenting as the damage
from duopoly is small. Again, for neck-to-neck competition patenting occurs in equilibrium
even with weaker patents. It follows, tighter patents can trigger additional patenting only
at moderate competition intensity, thereby reducing innovation profitability in this range.
Further, they induce higher wages only at moderate levels of competition that support
simultaneous patenting and movement, raising R&D expenditure in this range.
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Mobility of scientist personnel is a persistent source of knowledge externalities for innovating
firms (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Møen, 2005). In industries prone to this phenomenon,
poaching of competitors’ human capital forms an integral part of firms’ learning-by-hiring
objectives (Palomeras & Melero, 2010; Song et al., 2003). While strict enforcement of
non-compete covenants are often absent in the interest of employee freedom (Franco &
Mitchell, 2008), thereby exacerbating the incidence of undesired knowledge spillover through
scientist movement, keeping of trade secrets from a firm’s own employees, although optimal
under certain conditions, may reduce production efficiency (Rønde, 2001). In this context,
the role of intellectual property rights (IPR) in driving research initiatives takes prominence
when firms undertake internal R&D efforts to spur innovation. Indeed, greater risk of
scientist mobility may induce more frequent patenting (Kim & Marschke, 2005). In fact,
firms that acquire a reputation for IP toughness from frequently litigating their patents
can avert some mobility and knowledge spillover (Agarwal et al., 2009; Ganco et al., 2015).
However, difficulties concerning absolute appropriability of information remain as the
intangible nature of information limits complete applicability of property rights (Arrow,
1962).
Patents provide innovators a partial property right in that, they do not provide the patentee
“a right to exclude”, but rather, “a right to try to exclude” (Shapiro, 2003). Supposing that
the goal of patent rights is to achieve a balance between promoting innovation incentives
and restricting welfare-loss from limited technology spread (Reitzig et al., 2008), some
uncertainty in the patent system may be desirable in practice (Ayres & Klemperer, 1999).
The inherent uncertainties in the IPR regime provide a rationale for considering probabilistic
patents in economic models (Allison & Lemley, 1998; Lemley & Shapiro, 2005) and this
construct has seen extensive use in the literature on restitution laws (see Anton and Yao
(2007), Chen and Sappington (2018), Choi (2009), Schankerman and Scotchmer (2005) and
Shapiro (2016), to mention a few)1. However, recent patent reforms aim to strengthen IPR
1Damage rules are a recently emerging area in the literature on IPR. Primarily, two types of damage rules
are prevalent - (i) the “lost profit” (LP, henceforth) rule which measures damages as the reduction in
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protection by augmenting associated damage recovery, through improving the patentee’s
success-rate in litigations as well as enhancing damage awards. Examples abound in patent
policy changes, not just in the U.S. (Gallini, 2002; Jaffe, 2000; Moore, 2000) but across
jurisdictions such as Europe, Australia and Canada (Chien et al., 2018), and China and
Japan (Hu et al., 2020). Our paper studies the implications of market competition intensity
on innovation and further, its interactive effects with strengthening of the patent regime, in
presence of endogenous knowledge spillover due to scientist mobility.
The first part of our analysis primarily contributes to the perpetual discussion on the
relationship between intensity of competition and innovation. Despite umpteen analyses,
the literature has not reached a consensus between the contrasting arguments of Schumpeter
(1943), that suggests market concentration stimulates innovation, and Arrow (1962), that
propounds higher competition generates higher innovation. Instead, a large section of
subsequent studies agree on a non-monotone relation between innovation and competition
intensity (Aghion et al., 2005; Boone, 2001; De Bondt & Vandekerckhove, 2012; Houngbonon
& Jeanjean, 2016; Negassi et al., 2019), its specific nature varying by different measures
of competition and types of innovation (Belleflamme & Vergari, 2011; Tang, 2006; Vives,
2008)2. For example, Pal (2010) shows the relation of innovation and competition (negative
vs. positive) reverses by cost of technology-adoption. Bonanno and Haworth (1998) find
variation in choice of innovation (product vs. process) by competition intensity, the optimal
choices reversing depending on firm’s quality. In contrast to existing studies that focus
on creation of knowledge, Jansen (2011) studies the effects of competition on diffusion of
profit (or royalties, in case of licensing) of the patent owner due to infringement, and (ii) the “unjust
enrichment” rule (UE, henceforth) which measures damages as the infringer’s profit from infringement.
Another commonly referred damage regime, the “reasonable royalty rates” rule, measures damages as the
likely royalty rate in a hypothetical ex-ante licensing agreement between the innovator and the infringer.
In the preceding definition, this is subsumed under the LP rule. See Anton and Yao (2007), Choi (2009),
Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) and Schankerman and Scotchmer (2005) for a comparison of the LP
and UE rules, and Chen and Sappington (2018) for an analysis of their linear combination.
2See De Bondt and Vandekerckhove (2012) for a structured discussion of existing studies that support the
non-monotone trend of innovation with competition in the industrial organization literature.
5
knowledge by observing differential strategy choice for innovation protection (patenting vs.
secrecy) by modes of competition. Our paper examines the effects of competition intensity
on incentives to develop as well as diffuse an innovation by examining the implications of
product market competition on innovation attributes and patenting propensity in a model
of endogenous knowledge spillover due to scientist mobility. We depart from the existing
literature in that we analyze the relationship of competition and innovation in a framework
of scientist mobility3.
The second part of our analysis identifies the interactive effects between intensity of
competition and patent strength. An extensive literature on IPR have analyzed the
implications of stronger patents on innovation4. While there is consensus that stronger
patents induce greater patenting, ambiguity persists in their ability to stimulate greater
innovation (Bessen & Maskin, 2009; Ganguly, 2021; Hall, 2007; Lerner, 2009). Closest to
our setup of innovation and patent strength is the study by Ganguly (2021). Ganguly (2021)
examine effects of strengthening of property rights through patent reforms in industries
characterized by scientist mobility. However, they analyze this in a general model based on
ex-ante expected returns from the innovation. Our paper adds a new dimension to this
model by explicitly analyzing the characteristics of the market that the innovation affects.
Specifically, we identify the levels of market competition intensity at which the effects of a
stronger patent regime manifest.
A key assumption of our analysis of relationship of competition intensity with innovation
attributes is the perfect inference of potential market competition by the entrepreneur
and the scientist at the beginning of the research project’s development phase. We
subsequently relax this assumption to consider the possibility that although the scientist
3Although some existing studies consider R&D spillover (Hinloopen & Vandekerckhove, 2009; Qiu, 1997;
Schmutzler, 2010), they do not explicitly model the mechanism through which knowledge diffuses.
4For example, see Gallini (1992), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) for a discussion on optimal patent length and
breadth, Allred and Park (2007), Chen and Puttitanun (2005), Dinopoulos and Kottaridi (2008), Iwaisako
et al. (2011) for relative preferences of the north vs. south and Kanwar and Evenson (2003), Kyle and
McGahan (2012), Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) for analysis in the context of patent reforms.
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and the entrepreneur have some belief regarding possible future competition, the actual
intensity is known only when the product is ready to be marketed. It turns out, while the
nature of relationship of patenting, movement, profitability and R&D expenditure with
competition intensity remain identical to that in the main analysis, the level of competitive
pressure at which a stronger patent regime is efficacious alters, suggesting a further aspect
of consideration for patent reforms. A second assumption restricts the patenting cost in
the main analysis to be low enough to not only allow for the possibility of patenting but
also initiate the same at sufficiently low competition where movement occurs. Relaxing
this assumption proves all our main results robust except for the effect of stronger patents
on R&D investment, for which the equilibrium co-occurrence of patenting and movement is
crucial. Additionally, our main results stand robust when we use an alternate approach of
modeling market competition, wherein we consider strategic supply function competition in
the product market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops and solves the model of
innovation and market competition. Section 3 presents the results of a stronger patent
regime at different levels of competition intensity. Section 4 discusses the implications of
relaxing the model’s assumptions. Section 5 provides the alternate model of competition
intensity. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We develop a model in which innovation is static, certain and facilitated by firm’s internal
R&D efforts. The game takes place in two periods. In period 1, an innovating entrepreneur
hires a scientist to develop a novel idea into a tangible product. In period 2, she markets
the product to realize profits without any help from the scientist. The scientist joins the
entrepreneur’s firm in period 1 if his total expected earning from the research project
exceeds his reservation wage in two periods combined, his single-period reservation wage
equaling the value of his effort w̄. If he joins the project, he receives first period wage w0.
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In period 2, he chooses to either (i) stay at the entrepreneur’s firm and earn second period
wage w1, or (ii) leverage his knowledge from period 1 to move to or set up a rival firm and
earn product market profit in addition to w̄, or (iii) join the non-R&D sector and earn w̄.
The appearance of the rival in period 2 infringes the entrepreneur’s innovation. Accordingly,
the second period product market is a duopoly (monopoly) if the scientist moves (does not
move) to a rival enterprise. Let ρi and ρe denote the monopoly profit of the entrepreneur
and the duopoly profit of the rival in case it appears, respectively, from second period
product market competition. The rival’s appearance reduces the entrepreneur’s earning
under monopoly by a proportion λ, rendering her duopoly profit equal to (1−λ)ρi. However,
at the beginning of the second period, the entrepreneur can decide to patent the innovation,
thereby acquiring the right to partially recover her damages due to infringement, the
strength of the patent system determining the expected amount of recovery. Following
Ganguly (2021), we define a composite “measure of strength” of the patent regime as
σ(r, δ) = r · δ
where r, which denotes the probability of success if the patent is litigated in court of law,
captures the strength of enforcement, and δ, which denotes the proportion of damage
recovery when litigation is successful, captures the strength of the stipulated law. Thus,
patenting grants the innovator expected damage recovery amounting to σλρi. The cost of
patenting is c.
This setup of innovation and scientist mobility is exactly same as that in Ganguly (2021)5.
However, unlike Ganguly (2021), we explicitly model product market competition and
analyze the relationship of intensity of competition with patenting propensity, scientist
mobility, innovation profitability and R&D investment. We subsequently investigate the
interactive effects of competition intensity with patent regime strength. Let θ denote the
second period product market competition intensity. Now, notice that realized second
5Other studies that use a similar model of innovation and scientist mobility include Ganco et al. (2015),
Kim and Marschke (2005).
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period profits depend on market competition intensity. Consequently, the entrepreneur’s
loss due to infringement also varies with potential product market competition. Therefore,
we write λ as λ(θ) and further, express the rival’s profit as a proportion of the entrepreneur’s
duopoly profit, as ρe(θ) = κ.[1−λ(θ)]ρi(θ), where κ = 1 when the two firms face symmetric
optimization problems. For the rest of the analysis, we use a Hotelling model with market
expansion due to technology diffusion, to model product market competition. Section 5
provides an alternative model using the supply schedule framework of competition intensity
to bolster our main results.
We solve the game by backward induction. Deriving the second period expected earnings at
any given level of competition intensity, we solve for the entrepreneur’s (scientist’s) second
period patenting (movement) decision. Each agent is aware that the other will act optimally
when the second period arrives. Accordingly, the entrepreneur makes a first period wage
offer to match the scientist’s total reservation wage, which the scientist accepts, thereby
successfully launching the research project.
2.1 Hotelling Model of Competition Intensity
Suppose a Hotelling city of length L. If the entrepreneur’s idea is developed into a viable
product in period 2, the entrepreneur’s firm (firm 1) locates at point 0. If the scientist
moves to or sets up a rival in period 2, the rival firm (firm 2) locates at point L. We allow
market expansion due to scientist mobility by defining L = 1 if only firm 1 operates in
the market and L ≥ 1 if firm 2 appears6. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the
interval [0, L]. Thus, scientist mobility aids technology diffusion by expanding the potential
consumer base7. Consumers value each firm’s product at v and incur transportation cost t.
Each consumer can consume a maximum of one unit of the product. We normalize costs of
each firm to 0 and assume v ≥ 2t to ensure market coverage. Under monopoly, firm 1’s
6This structure of market expansion due to technology diffusion follows Chen and Sappington (2018).
7This is likely when the rival’s appearance attracts consumers in a different geographical location or
demographic group.
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profit maximization exercise yields ρi = v − t. To derive the duopoly profits, suppose x is
the indifferent consumer on the interval [0, L] such that v − xt− p1 = v − (L− x)t− p2,














pi with respect to pi yields (1− λ)ρi = ρe =
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The inverse of the transportation cost measures the competitive pressure in the market,
implying θ = 1
t
. Thus, the second period returns to the entrepreneur, the rival if it appears,
and the loss to the entrepreneur if the rival appears are expressed as functions of intensity













To solve for the optimal choice variables of the entrepreneur and the scientist in the game
of innovation, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: The second period realized θ becomes common knowledge at the beginning
of the first period after the entrepreneur conceptualizes the product.
Assumption 2: (a) c <
L2vσ
(1 + σ)L2 + 2σ




Assumption 1 implies the entrepreneur and the scientist are able to correctly infer second
period competition intensity at the beginning of the first period, when the entrepreneur
perceives the idea for the product. Therefore, the second period optimal behavior and
corresponding returns are known to the entrepreneur and scientist while making first
period choices. Assumption 2a requires cost of patenting to be sufficiently low given
expected recovery such that patenting is feasible. Assumption 2b states a stricter condition
on patenting cost to ensure patenting for some levels of competition intensity at which
movement occurs. We subsequently discuss the implications of relaxing Assumptions 1 and








θ4 θ1 θ2 θ3
M,p = 0
M,p = 1 S, p = 1
S, p = 1 S, p = 0
Figure 1: Patenting and Mobility by Competition Intensity
2.2 Patenting and Movement
Let p = 1 (0) denote the entrepreneur’s decision to patent (not patent) the innovation and
M (S) denote the scientist’s decision to move to a rival firm (stay at the entrepreneur’s firm),
in period 2. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium patenting behavior of the entrepreneur
and movement behavior of the scientist for different levels of product market competition
intensity (see Appendix A for complete derivation).
First consider θ < θ1. Very low intensity of competition implies high product differentiation
and high potential duopoly profits for the entrepreneur and the rival. Further, greater
consumer misalignment under monopoly implies lower return to the entrepreneur from
retaining her monopoly stature. Therefore, the scientist’s gain from movement exceeds
the entrepreneur’s loss due to product market competition. Consequently, there is no
wage at which the entrepreneur finds it optimal to retain the scientist, thereby permitting
movement in equilibrium. Within this range, when θ4 ≤ θ < θ1, relatively high damage
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from competition induces the entrepreneur to patent the innovation, not to deter movement
but rather to reduce her loss from infringement.
Next suppose θ1 < θ < θ2. Relatively higher competition intensity shrinks duopoly profits
and suggests higher return under monopoly. As a result, the entrepreneur’s loss due to
advent of a rival exceeds the scientist’s potential gain at the rival, rendering it optimal
for the entrepreneur to expend the required second period wage to retain the scientist
and prevent movement. Patenting occurs in equilibrium when the savings in wage, which
equals damage recovery under movement, exceeds its cost. Now, as patenting occurs in
θ4 < θ < θ1, the potential damage recovery (and hence, savings in wage) must exceed the
cost of patenting at relatively higher competition intensity in θ1 < θ < θ2 where the damage
from infringement is higher, implying equilibrium patenting in this entire range. It follows,
for θ1 < θ < θ2, w1 = ρe − σλρi + w̄.
When θ > θ2, duopoly returns are very low and loss to the entrepreneur due to competition is
high implying high potential damage payment. Therefore, the scientist’s preferred movement
alternative is the non-R&D sector (rival firm) if the innovation is patented (not patented).
Accordingly, the entrepreneur offers w1 = w̄ (w1 = ρe + w̄) to retain the scientist in
equilibrium. Patenting occurs (does not occur) in equilibrium when competition is relatively
less (more) intense, i.e. θ2 < θ < θ3 (θ > θ3), such that relatively higher (lower) profit at
the rival suggests significant (insufficient) savings in wage from patenting. Proposition 1
summarizes the relationship of patenting and movement behavior with competition intensity.
Proposition 1. The following define the nature of relationship between intensity of
competition and second period equilibrium patenting and movement.
(i) Patenting behavior has a non-monotone relation to the level of competitive pressure
in the market.
(ii) Movement behavior has a monotone relation to the level of competitive pressure in
the market.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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To understand the result, first consider the incidence of patenting. Intuitively, one may
expect firms to patent more frequently as product market competition intensity increases
to protect novel innovations from infringement and appropriate monopoly profits. However,
in markets where mobility is a common phenomenon, this is not necessarily true. A rise
in intensity of competition causes an innovating entrepreneur to go from not patenting to
patenting if competition intensity is relatively low but reverses this behavior if competitive
pressure is high. The intuition follows from the entrepreneur’s motive behind patenting.
With a damage recovery regime where reparation cost is borne by the infringing rival, the
reason for patenting is loss (wage) reduction at low (high) levels of competition intensity.
While at low levels of competition, relative increase in competition intensity implies increase
in loss recovery and induces patenting, at high competition intensity, its increase above a
threshold value leads to low duopoly profits and thus, low wage reduction due to patenting,
rendering patenting unprofitable. As a result, the rise of competition intensity above a
threshold increases the incidence of patenting when competitive pressure is low but reduces
the same when competitive pressure is relatively higher. Contrastingly, movement, being
induced at low values of competitive pressure due to attractive returns and meager damages,
and ceasing at higher levels as losses rise and returns diminish, admits a monotone relation
to competition intensity.
2.3 Profit and R&D
The innovator’s return from the research project comprises her profit from commercializing
the new product, the value of the scientist’s work if he stays at her firm in period 2, and
her expected damage recovery in case infringement occurs and the innovation is patented.
Her expenditures include the scientist’s total wage bill and the cost of patenting wherever
applicable. Lemma 1 derives the total profitability of the research project for different
combinations of patenting and movement decision alternatives.
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−w̄ + ρi + ρe − λρi, M, p = 0
−w̄ + ρi + ρe − λρi − c, M, p = 1
−w̄ + ρi − c, S, p = 1
−w̄ + ρi, S, p = 0
Proof. See Appendix A.
The entrepreneur’s R&D expenditure excluding patenting cost comprises the total outlay
toward scientist wage8. This includes only the first period wage if the scientist moves in
period 2, and the sum of first and second period wages if he stays at the entrepreneur’s firm.
Lemma 2 derives the R&D expenditure of the research project for different combinations of
patenting and movement decision alternatives.















w̄ − ρe, M, p = 0
w̄ − ρe + σλρi, M, p = 1
2w̄, S, p = 0 or 1
Proof. See Appendix A.
Mapping total profitability (R&D expenditure) for the decision alternatives in Lemma 1
(Lemma 2) with corresponding ranges of competition intensity in Figure 1, we derive the
direction of movement in π (R&D) within each range of θ. Lemma 3 delineates.
Lemma 3. The following describe the direction of effect of increase in competition intensity
on profit and R&D expenditure by levels of θ:
(i) 0 to θ4: Profit decreases; R&D increases
8This definition of R&D expenditure follows Ganguly (2021) and Kim and Marschke (2005).
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(ii) θ4 to θ1: Profit decreases; R&D increases
(iii) θ1 to θ2: Profit increases; R&D remains constant
(iv) θ2 to θ3: Profit increases; R&D remains constant
(v) θ3 to ∞: Profit increases; R&D remains constant
Proof. See Appendix A.
As intensity of competition increases, profit initially decreases when θ is low and then
increases when θ is moderate or high. On the contrary, R&D expenditure increases with an
increase in competition intensity at low levels of θ and remains constant for moderate and
high θ. Proposition 2 summarizes the resulting relationship of profit and R&D expenditure
to competition intensity in presence of scientist mobility.
Proposition 2. The following define the nature of relationship of intensity of competition
with total profitability and R&D expenditure of the innovation.
(i) Total profitability has a non-monotone relation to the level of competitive pressure in
the market.
(ii) R&D expenditure has a non-monotone relation to the level of competitive pressure in
the market.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 3.
To understand the result, notice that entrepreneur’s total profitability with scientist
movement is the sum of the second period duopoly profits net of the scientist’s reservation
wage and patenting cost if patenting occurs. Therefore, the innovation’s total profitability
falls for the first two ranges of θ where movement occurs, as an increase in competition
intensity diminishes duopoly profits. However, as competitive pressure rises further,
movement ceases, resulting in a monopoly in the second period. Therefore, total profit,
which now consists of the entrepreneur’s monopoly profit net of reservation wage and












Figure 2: Total Profitability and R&D Expenditure by Competition Intensity
transportation cost implying greater consumer alignment. R&D expenditure increases with
increase in competition intensity at low levels of θ as the decrease in duopoly profits due to
increase in competition intensity implies lower second period return to the scientist when
movement occurs, requiring an increase in the first period wage. However, as higher values
of competition intensity prevent movement, R&D expenditure remains constant and equal
to the total reservation earning of the scientist. Figure 2 illustrates the results9.
An interesting observation can be made here. Note that at θ1 the profit trend is continuous,
as breaks occur only at points of reversal of patenting behavior. As a result, comparing
the values of θ marginally above θ1 to those sufficiently below θ1 reveals the possibility
of higher profitability for the entrepreneur under duopoly as compared to that in case
she retains her monopoly stature. This is because, the possibility of scientist mobility
facilitates market expansion due to technology diffusion, which in turn allows the industry
profit under duopoly to exceed monopoly profit when competition in the duopoly market is
not too intense. As adjustments in the scientist’s first period wage neutralize his returns,
the entire benefit of higher industry profit is reaped by the entrepreneur, resulting in
higher profitability of her innovation under duopoly as compared to that under monopoly.
Corollary 1 formalizes the result.
Corollary 1. For an innovation facilitated by internal R&D efforts, technology diffusion
9The graphs are illustrative and not drawn to scale.
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through scientist mobility can augment the project’s profitability.
3 Stronger Patent Regime and Competition Intensity
Patent reforms seek to strengthen patent rights by enhancing not only the degree but also the
credibility of IPR protection. Accordingly, we suppose strengthening of the patent regime
through increase in either the litigation success probability (r), or the damage recovery
proportion (δ), or both, thereby implying an increase in the measure of strength (σ). This
section explores the interactive effects of regime strength and competition intensity on the
innovator and the innovation. We analyze the implications of increase in patent strength on
the relationship of competition intensity with patenting propensity, scientist mobility, total
profitability and R&D expenditure, and further, identify the effects of stronger patents at
varying levels of market competition.
3.1 Patenting and Movement
Figure 3 delineates the interactive effects of patent strength and competition intensity on
the second period equilibrium patenting and movement decisions in the σ − θ plane. By
Assumption 2a we have θ4 < θ2 =⇒ σ ∈ [σB, 1]. Further, by Assumption 2b we have
θ4 < θ1 =⇒ σ ∈ [σA, 1]
10. Hence, for the rest of the analysis, we refer to the range [σA, 1].
A detailed derivation of Figure 3 is available in Appendix A. Lemma 4 summarizes the
effect of stronger patent laws on the relation of competition intensity with equilibrium
patenting and movement, as depicted in Figure 3.
Lemma 4. Tightening of the patent system sustains the non-monotone (monotone) relation
of competitive pressure with patenting (movement).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Although increase in patent strength does not affect the nature of relationship between
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Figure 3: Interaction between Patent Strength and Competition Intensity
competition intensity and second period equilibrium choices, it does influence the incidence of
patenting. The incidence of movement, however, remains unaltered11. Lemma 5 summarizes.
Lemma 5. The following define the effect of a stronger patent regime on second period
equilibrium patenting and movement.
(i) Tightening of the patent system expands the range of competition intensity over which
patenting occurs by initiating additional patenting at relatively lower competition.
(ii) Tightening of the patent system has no effect on the range of competition intensity
over which movement occurs.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 is as follows. A greater patent strength
11This is in accordance with the finding in Ganguly (2021) that stronger IPRs lead to increase in expected
patenting propensity but do not thwart potential movement.
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augments expected recovery from patenting such that it exceeds patenting cost at relatively
low competition where loss is small. However, even with full recovery, the threshold level
of competition intensity below which patenting is unprofitable remains positive, implying
no equilibrium patenting at some very low intensity of competition, thereby sustaining
the non-monotone relation between competition intensity and patenting. Further, as an
increase in expected recovery does not alter movement at any level of competition intensity,
there is no change in either its nature of relation with or its incidence at different levels of
competition intensity.
3.2 Profit and R&D
Given the effects of stronger patents on the second period decision alternatives, we now
derive their corresponding implications for total profit and R&D expenditure of the research
project. Corollary 2 provides the effect of increase in patent regime strength on trends of
profit and R&D expenditure with competition intensity.
Corollary 2. Tightening of the patent system sustains the non-monotone relation of
competition intensity with total profitability and R&D expenditure of the innovation.
Proof. See Appendix A.
To derive the interactive effects of stronger patents and competition intensity on project
profitability and R&D expenditure, we define the following.
Definition 1. Given θ4(σ), θ
′
4(σ) < 0 and θ
′′
4(σ) > 0, let θ̂4 = θ4(σ = 1).
By Definition 1, θ̂4 denotes the lower threshold above which patenting initiates for maximum
patent strength. Therefore, it is the minimum level of competition intensity at which
patenting can occur in equilibrium, such that even for the strongest patent that provides full
protection guarantee, the entrepreneur does not find it optimal to expend the patenting cost
to protect against potential infringement. Proposition 3 (Proposition 4) derives the effect
of strengthening of the patent regime on realized profit (R&D expenditure) at different
levels of competition intensity.
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Proposition 3. Stronger patents can decrease innovation profitability when market
competition intensity is moderately low (i.e. θ̂4 < θ < θ1), but have no effect otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Although one may expect strengthening of the patent regime to boost innovation incentives,
we show that, counter-intuitively, stronger patents are detrimental to the patent holder’s
profits. Ganguly (2021) depict a similar effect of increase in patent strength in a general
model of innovation and scientist mobility. They show that reforms aimed at tightening
the patent system decrease the ex-ante expected profitability of an innovation12. However,
unlike Ganguly (2021), we derive the explicit market conditions under which the expected
decrease in profitability manifests. Our results suggest that the counter-intuitive effect of
stronger patents on innovation profitability may materialize only in those industries prone
to scientist mobility where product market competition is moderately low. However, if
product market competition is very low or highly intense, patent strength has no effect
on innovation profitability. The result provides the importance of market structure in
determining the (in)efficacy of patent policy reforms in advancing innovation incentives.
The intuition behind the result emanates from the reason for a fall in profit due to an
increase in regime strength: the increased incidence of patenting. Patenting is not optimal
at very low and very high intensity of competition due to low losses from market competition
implying low recovery and insignificant wage reduction due to patenting, respectively, that
do not suffice to cover the patenting cost. Thus, the possibility of an increase in the
incidence of patenting remains in the middle values of θ where patenting may occur. As we
suppose a sufficiently high σ to ensure patenting for some levels of competition intensity
12This effect of stronger patents on ex-ante expected profitability holds in our model of competition as well.
To check this, suppose f is the density function of θ. We can write:













Differentiating E(π) with respect to σ gives the result. Calculations are available upon request.
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that induce movement, an increase in expected recovery additionally prompts patenting for
moderately low values of competitive pressure that did not initially support it.
Proposition 4. Stronger patents can increase R&D investment when market competition
intensity is moderately low (i.e. θ̂4 < θ < θ1), but have no effect otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 4 provides specific market conditions under which the general result of higher
ex-ante expected R&D expenditure in Ganguly (2021) holds13. To understand the result,
notice that at relatively high competition intensity, when the scientist optimally decides to
stay with the entrepreneur, any reduction in second period wage due to increase in potential
loss recovery is countered by an equal increase in the first period wage, rendering total
R&D expenditure constant at the scientist’s total reservation wage. Further, at very low
values of competition intensity at which patenting is not optimal despite scientist movement
in equilibrium, a higher expected recovery has no effect on scientists’ return, and therefore,
R&D investment. As a result, a stronger patent regime induces higher R&D investment in
the middle range of competition intensity where both movement and patenting occur in
equilibrium. It suggests, policies aimed at increasing R&D investment via stronger patent
rules must take into account the competitive pressure in the concerned market to prove
effective.
4 Relaxing Assumptions
The primary implications of the analysis prevail relevant when we consider possible
alternatives to our assumptions. This section discusses how relaxing Assumptions 1 and 2b
13To derive this result in our model of competition, differentiate the following with respect to σ:








(ρe + w̄)f(θ) d(θ)
Calculations are available upon request.
21
modify our main results.
Assumption 1 supposes situations in which the innovating entrepreneur and her scientist are
able to perfectly foresee the second period competition intensity in case a duopoly arises.
For example, an existing firm innovating a new product may be aware of the location of
her potential rival due to competition in the market for other products. In this case, the
consumers’ transportation cost and hence, the level of competition are common knowledge.
Alternatively, the actual level of competition intensity may be realized and known only at
the beginning of the second period if the scientist sets up a rival whose location is priorly
unknown. In this case, the first period decisions depend on the distribution of θ. Our main
results regarding the nature of relationship between competition intensity and patenting,
movement, profit and R&D expenditure remain unaltered in case we suppose the latter.
However, the effect of a stronger patent regime on total profit and R&D expenditure at
different levels of competition intensity are reversed. It follows, policies aimed at effecting
innovation profitability or investment must not only consider the new product market’s
competition intensity but also heed the agents’ knowledge of the same. On the other hand,
relaxing Assumption 2b renders patenting cost high enough to prevent patenting at any level
of competition which induces movement. Our main results remain unchanged, except for
the effect of stronger patents on R&D expenditure at moderate competition, which proves
ineffective due to no equilibrium patenting when movement occurs. A detailed analysis of
relaxing the assumptions is available in Appendix B.
5 Alternate Model of Competition Intensity
As an alternate to the Hotelling framework with linear transportation cost, we consider a
linear supply schedule framework where the slope of the supply function measures intensity
of competition. Employing the model from Menezes and Quiggin (2012) to derive the second
period profit expressions under monopoly and duopoly as functions of competition intensity,
we find that the competition levels defining boundaries for reversals in second period
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equilibrium patenting and movement exactly correspond to the ranges of θ in the preceding
analysis. Therefore, the results from the supply schedule model of competition intensity
will follow analogous to the Hotelling model discussed in our main analysis. However,
this framework does not suppose market expansion due to technology diffusion and thus,
eliminates the possibility of movement in equilibrium. The complete derivation of this
model is available in Appendix C.
6 Conclusion
This study aims to further the understanding of implications of patent regime strength
and intensity of product market competition, and their joint effects, on patenting, labor
mobility, R&D expenditure and profitability of innovating firms. The first part of the
analysis reports the relationships of innovation attributes with competition intensity in the
market for the new technology, when scientist mobility is a prevalent source of knowledge
spillover within industries. The results suggest surprising relations between the market’s
competitive pressure and the incidence of patenting and movement. While higher potential
competition does not necessarily sustain patenting, it does halt movement. However,
preventing movement may not be favorable to profit. We find that even though a moderate
level of expected competition retains monopoly, it renders the entrepreneur’s profit lower as
compared to her duopoly profit under less intensive competition that permits movement.
The second part of the paper identifies the interaction effects between increase in patent
strength and market competition intensity on patenting, scientist movement and innovation.
Greater patent strength leads to lower profitability through increased patenting in moderately
competitive markets, although very lenient as well as highly competitive markets are exempt
from its effect. It turns out, in markets where scientist mobility is feasible and competition
is moderate, patenting, resulting from the profit motive, is in practice counter-profitable.
Higher expected R&D investment resulting from stronger patents also actualizes only in
moderately competitive markets. The results suggest that patent policy reforms aimed
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at protecting innovating entrepreneurs or raising scientist wages must take into account
not only their expected repercussions but also the competitive pressure in their targeted
markets.
The above results follow for a model of product innovation and certain R&D, with the degree
of product differentiation indicating market competitive pressure. As further analyses, it
would be interesting to introduce knowledge spillover due to scientist mobility in alternative
models of R&D and oligopoly structure to analyze how our predictions modify under
different innovation choices and modes of competition.
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Construction of Figure 1
Case I: Let ρe > λρi =⇒ θ <
L2+1
v
= θ1, say. It follows, the scientist’s gain at the
rival exceeds the entrepreneur’s loss due to infringement. Therefore, movement occurs
in equilibrium. Patenting occurs if σλρi ≥ c =⇒ θ ≥
σ(2+L2)
2(vσ−c)




Assumption 2a. We have θ4 < θ1 by Assumption 2b.





= θ2, say (θ2 > θ1 as
σ < 1). The first inequality implies the entrepreneur finds it optimal to retain the scientist
as opposed to suffering loss in profit due to movement. Therefore, movement does not occur
in equilibrium. The second inequality suggests that the scientist prefers moving to the rival
firm as opposed to the non-R&D sector, regardless of whether the innovation is patented.
Patenting occurs if σλρi ≥ c =⇒ θ ≥ θ4, which is true for all θ in this case. Consequently,
w1 = ρe − σλρi + w̄.
Case III: Let 0 < ρe ≤ σλρi. The first part of the inequality holds trivially. The second part
implies θ ≥ θ2. It follows, the scientist prefers moving to the non-R&D sector (rival firm) if
the innovation is patented (not patented). Consequently, w1 = w̄ (w1 = ρe + w̄). Clearly,




say. Assumption 2a ensures θ3 > θ2.











σλρi is a downward shift of the curve λρi by (1−σ) with the curvature remaining unchanged.
The curves intersect to partition the range of θ into segments indicated by θ1, θ2, θ3 and
θ4 derived above and accordingly determine whether patenting and movement occur for a
given level of competition intensity. 
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows directly from Figure 1. In 0 < θ < θ4, p = 0. Then, in θ1 < θ < θ3,
p = 1, but again in θ > θ3, p = 0. Therefore, patenting behavior exhibits a non-monotone
30
trend with increase in θ. For movement, we have M in θ < θ1 and S in θ > θ1, implying a
monotone trend. 
Proof of Lemma 1
First consider the decision alternatives M, p = 0. This corresponds to θ < θ4. As the
scientist moves and the entrepreneur chooses not to patent the innovation, the scientist’s
second period earning equals ρe + w̄. Accordingly, the scientist’s participation constraint
implies w0 = 2w̄ − (ρe + w̄) = w̄ − ρe. ∴ π = (1− λ)ρi − (w̄ − ρe) = −w̄ + ρi + ρe − λρi.
Next consider M, p = 1 which corresponds to θ4 < θ < θ1. The scientist’s second period
earning equals ρe−σλρi+w̄. The participation constraint implies w0 = 2w̄−(ρe−σλρi+w̄) =
w̄ − ρe + σλρi. ∴ π = (1− λ)ρi + σλρi − (w̄ − ρe + σλρi)− c = −w̄ + ρi + ρe − λρi − c.
The choice of decision alternatives S, p = 1 corresponds to θ1 < θ < θ3. In θ1 < θ < θ2,
w1 = ρe − σλρi + w̄. Therefore, w0 = 2w̄ − (ρe − σλρi + w̄) = w̄ − ρe + σλρi. ∴ π =
ρi + w̄ − (ρe − σλρi + w̄) − (w̄ − ρe + σλρi) − c = −w̄ + ρi − c. In θ2 < θ < θ3, w1 = w̄.
Therefore, w0 = 2w̄ − (w̄) = w̄. ∴ π = ρi + w̄ − (w̄ + w̄)− c = −w̄ + ρi − c.
Finally, S, p = 0 corresponds to θ > θ3. Here, w1 = ρe+ w̄. Therefore, w0 = 2w̄− (ρe+ w̄) =
w̄ − ρe. ∴ π = ρi + w̄ − (ρe + w̄)− (w̄ − ρe) = −w̄ + ρi. 
Proof of Lemma 2
We already derived the expressions for w0 and w1 in the proof of Lemma 1. When M, p = 0
for θ < θ4, wage expenditure consists only the first period wage. ∴ R&D = w0 = w̄ − ρe.
Similarly, when M, p = 1 in θ4 < θ < θ1, R&D = w0 = w̄ − ρe + σλρi. Finally, when the
scientist stays (S), his participation constraint implies R&D = w0 + w1 = 2w̄, regardless of
whether the innovation is patented. 
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Proof of Lemma 3






> 0 and ∂ρe
∂θ
< 0. Further,
w̄ and c are constants with respect to θ. Therefore, the proof follows from Lemma 1, Lemma
2 and the following decision alternatives within the ranges of θ: (i) 0 to θ4: M, p = 0; (ii)
θ4 to θ1: M, p = 1; (iii) θ1 to θ2: S, p = 1; (iv) θ2 to θ3: S, p = 1; (v) θ3 to ∞: S, p = 0. 
Construction of Figure 3














. θ1 and θ3 are constant
with respect to σ. For θ2,
∂θ2
∂σ
< 0 and ∂
2θ2
∂σ2
> 0. Also, σ → 0 =⇒ θ2 → ∞ and
σ = 1 =⇒ θ2 = θ1. Accordingly, the graph for θ2 follows. To derive the graph for θ4,
observe Assumption 2a requires σ > c
v
. Therefore, θ4 > 0,
∂θ4
∂σ




θ1 = θ4 at σ =
2c(L2+1)
L2v
= σA and θ2 = θ4 at σ =
L2c
L2(v−c)−2c
= σB. Further, θ2 = θ3 at




which holds given Assumption 2a. Again, as θ2 > θ1 at σ < 1, σB < σA.
To understand Assumptions 2a and 2b, make the following observations from the figure. At




which requires Assumption 2a. At any given value of σ, for patenting to be possible at




requires Assumption 2b. 
Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose σ ∈ [σA, 1]. First consider patenting: p = 0 when 0 < θ < θ4, p = 1 when
θ4 < θ < θ3, and again p = 0 when θ3 < θ < ∞. Further, at maximum strength i.e.
σ = 1, θ4 > 0. Therefore, the non-monotone relation between patenting and competition
intensity sustains ∀σ ∈ [σA, 1]. Next consider movement: M when θ < θ1 and S when
θ > θ1. Further, θ1 is constant with respect to σ. Therefore, the monotone relation between
movement and competition intensity sustains ∀σ ∈ [σA, 1]. 
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Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose σ ∈ [σA, 1]. Patenting occurs in θ4 < θ < θ3. As θ
′
4(σ) < 0 and θ
′
3(σ) = 0, it
follows that the range of patenting expands with increase in σ with additional patenting at
lower levels of θ. Movement occurs in 0 < θ < θ1. As θ
′
1(σ) = 0, there is no change in the
range of movement with increase in σ. 
Proof of Corollary 2
Consider the ranges of θ in Lemma 3. Lemma 5 suggests a widening (narrowing) of the
second and fourth (first and third) ranges with increase in σ. Further, Lemma 4 suggests
these ranges remain qualitatively equivalent as σ rises. This implies, although the width
of the ranges alter due to increase in patent strength, there is no reversal of patenting
and movement decision within or across ranges due to increase in σ. Next, consider the
direction of movement in profit and R&D with increase in θ within the ranges in Lemma 3.
For given patenting and movement decision alternatives, Lemma 1 implies no change in
profit with increase in σ, and Lemma 2 indicates an increase in R&D expenditure only for
M, p = 1 as σ rises. It follows, there is no change in the trend of π and R&D with θ due to
increase in σ within any range of θ. Consequently, the non-monotone trend of π and R&D
with θ remains unaltered as σ rises. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Lemma 1 implies, at any given θ if the entrepreneur goes from not patenting to patenting
the innovation when the scientist moves, profit falls by the amount of patenting cost. Now,
check from Figure 3 that as σ rises, θ4 and θ2 fall while θ1 and θ3 remain constant. Notice
that θ2 does not partition patenting behavior. Let θ
0
4 be the initial threshold below which







range of θ where incidence of patenting increases. Hence, profit falls in this range. It follows,






σ ∈ [σA, 1], the maximum possible θ
0
4 is θ1 and the minimum possible θ
′
4 is θ̂4. Consequently,
the profit reducing effect of increase in patent strength can only manifest within the range
θ̂4 < θ < θ1. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Lemma 2 implies, at any given θ if the entrepreneur goes from not patenting to patenting
the innovation when the scientist moves, R&D expenditure increases by σλρi. Further, an
increase in σ increases R&D expenditure whenM, p = 1 due to increase in damage reparation.





4 due to increased patenting, and (b) θ
0
4 − θ1 due to increased expected
reparation, as σ rises. It follows, increase in σ has no effect on R&D expenditure for values
of θ in ranges 0− θ
′
4 and θ1 −∞. Now, notice that increase in σ certainly increases R&D
expenditure in θ4(σ) < θ < θ1 ∀σ ∈ [σA, 1]. Again, as σ ∈ [σA, 1], the minimum possible θ
′
4
is θ̂4. Consequently, the R&D augmenting effect of increase in patent strength can manifest
within the range θ̂4 < θ < θ1. 
Appendix B
Relaxing Assumption 1
We relax Assumption 1 and suppose the entrepreneur and the scientist cannot infer the
actual level of competition intensity at the beginning of the first period. Let θ be a random
variable with density f , which is common knowledge. As the competition intensity in the
market is realized at the beginning of the second period, movement, patenting and second
period realized returns remain same as in the main analysis. The entrepreneur, knowing the
optimal second period movement behavior for any potential level of competition intensity,
maximizes her expected profit at the beginning of the first period to determine the optimal
first period wage, subject to the scientist’s participation constraint. The scientist, knowing
the optimal second period wage offer for each level of competition intensity, participates in
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the entrepreneur’s project in the first period if the expected wage in both periods combined
exceeds his total reservation wage 2w̄. Substituting the second period returns for different
levels of competition intensity in the participation constraint of the scientist (which is
2w̄ ≤ w0 + E(w1), where E(w1) denotes his expected return in period 2) gives the first
period wage w0 as:













Table B.1 delineates the realized values of the entrepreneur’s second period profit π1 and
the scientist’s second period wage w1 for different ranges of θ. Recall ρi and σλρi rise and
ρe falls as θ rises. The patenting cost c is constant. Therefore, in the first range, an increase
in θ causes π1 = ρi − λρi = ρe to fall, implying an inverse relationship between competition
intensity and realized profit. In the second range, π1 = ρi − λρi + σλρi − c = ρe + σλρi − c
increases, remains constant or decreases as θ rises according as σ R L2
2+L2
. As movement
occurs for all values of θ in both ranges, an increase in θ does not induce second period wage
payment, leaving w1 constant at 0. It is straightforward to check that π1 increases with an
increase in θ in the remaining three ranges and w1 decreases in the third and fifth range
while remaining constant over the fourth range of θ. Given w0, for any level of competition
intensity in the second period, the total profit of the entrepreneur is −w0 + π1, where π1
is the entrepreneur’s second period profit. The total R&D expenditure of the research
project is w0 if movement occurs and w0 + w1 otherwise. As w0 is determined in the first
period and is constant, the relation of competition intensity with realized profit and R&D
expenditure of the innovation follow the relation of π1 and w1, respectively. It follows,
our results on the nature of relation of competition intensity with patenting, movement,
realized profit and R&D expenditure of the innovation in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2
hold. However, the direction of change in realized profit and R&D expenditure within each
range of θ is not necessarily congruent to the main analysis.
Table B.2 compares the effect of increase in competition intensity on profit and R&D
expenditure with and without Assumption 1 by range of θ. For profit, relaxing Assumption
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Range of θ Movement Decision Patenting Decision π1 w1
0 to θ4 M p = 0 ρi − λρi 0
θ4 to θ1 M p = 1 ρi − λρi + σλρi − c 0
θ1 to θ2 S p = 1 ρi − ρe + σλρi − c ρe − σλρi + w̄
θ2 to θ3 S p = 1 ρi − c w̄
θ3 to ∞ S p = 0 ρi − ρe ρe + w̄
Table B.1: Second Period Profit and Wage by Competition Intensity
Range of θ
With Assumption 1 Without Assumption 1
Profit R&D Expenditure Profit R&D Expenditure
0 to θ4 Decreases Increases Decreases Remains constant
θ4 to θ1 Decreases Increases Ambiguous Remains constant
θ1 to θ2 Increases Remains constant Increases Decreases
θ2 to θ3 Increases Remains constant Increases Remains constant
θ3 to ∞ Increases Remains constant Increases Decreases
Table B.2: Effect of Competition Intensity by Assumption 1
1 contrasts the main analysis in the second range of θ. As θ increases within this range,
while duopoly returns contract due to higher competition intensity, recovery from patenting
rises due to greater losses. If the expected recovery is sufficiently high as compared to
the ratio of the magnitude of change in profit to change in loss incurred for unit increase
in competition intensity, the total profit of the entrepreneur under duopoly may increase
with an increase in competitive pressure. However, this is not the case when the realized
competition intensity is inferred at the beginning of the first period, as any increase in
potential damage recovery lowers the scientist’s second period return and must be exactly
adjusted in the first period wage, implying the effect of competition intensity on the second
period realized profit is solely determined by its effect on duopoly returns. Next, consider
R&D expenditure. With Assumption 1, a rise in competition intensity in the first two ranges
of θ causes scientist’s returns from movement to fall, requiring an increase in the first period
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wage to compensate. But relaxing Assumption 1 implies the first period wage is determined
and paid out based on expected competition intensity, and hence is constant. As a result,
increase in realized competition intensity within the first two ranges of θ does not have
any effect on w0, and therefore on R&D expenditure. Similarly, when Assumption 1 holds,
adjustments in the first period wage cause the combined wage in both periods to remain at
2w̄ irrespective of the level of competition intensity. However, without Assumption 1, such
adjustments are ruled out and wherever potential duopoly returns determine scientist wage,
a decreasing w1 causes R&D expenditure to decrease with increasing competitive pressure.
A stronger patent regime affects the relation of realized profit and R&D expenditure with
competition intensity through two avenues - (i) change in w0 due to change in expected
second period earnings, and (ii) change in π1 and w1 within ranges of θ as well as thresholds
defining the ranges. Lemma B.1 states the effect of an increase in recovery proportion on
the first period wage.
Lemma B.1: A stricter patent regime augments the first period wage, i.e. w0 increases
with an increase in σ.





























































































Check by replacing θ2 =
(1+σ)L2+2σ
2vσ
that the term within third brackets in the second part



































The fourth term in ∂w0
∂σ
equals 0.











































> 0, the second term in the above expression is positive. The
first term is also positive. Therefore, ∂w0
∂σ
> 0. 
An increase in σ increases the first period wage by Lemma B.1, exerting a negative pressure
on total profitability and a positive pressure on R&D expenditure of the innovation. Further,
higher σ implies higher π1 in the second and third ranges of θ and a lower w1 in the third
range of θ from Table B.1. The relevant ranges of θ remain qualitatively similar, with
a widening of second and fourth range and a narrowing of the first and third, as in our
main analysis. The direction of change in profit in all but the second range, and R&D
expenditure in all ranges, with an increase in competitive pressure is independent of σ,
implying no change in their relation with competition intensity within these ranges. An
increase in σ may reverse the direction of change in profit in the second range of competition
intensity if it increases from an initial value less than the threshold to exceed the same.
Nevertheless, the relation of profit and R&D expenditure with competition intensity remains
non-monotone, implying Corollary 2 from the main analysis holds. Relaxing Assumption 1,
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however, reverses the effect of increase in patent strength on total profit (R&D expenditure)
defined by Proposition 3 (Proposition 4). Proposition B.3 (Proposition B.4) summarizes
the results when Assumption 1 does not hold.
Proposition B.3: A stronger patent system decreases the innovation’s profitability at
sufficiently low and high levels of competition intensity, but its effect at moderate competitive
pressure is ambiguous.
Proof. w0 increases with an increase in σ by Lemma B.1. Total profitability is defined
by π = −w0 + π1. In the first, fourth and fifth ranges of θ, π1 remains constant with an
increase in σ, implying a fall in π through w0. In the second and third ranges, an increase
in σ increases π1, implying the combined effect on π is ambiguous. 
Proposition B.4: A stronger patent system increases R&D investment at low and high
levels of competition intensity, but its effect at moderate competitive pressure is ambiguous.
Proof. R&D expenditure is defined by R&D = w0 + w1. In all but the third range of θ,
w1 remains constant as σ increases, implying an increase in R&D through w0. In the third
range, an increase in σ reduces w1, implying the combined effect on R&D is ambiguous. 
The intuition follows from incomplete information in the first period when the entrepreneur
adjusts the scientist’s joining offer in response to a decrease in his expected second period
returns due to increase in patent regime strength. This adjustment is uniform irrespective
of the actual level of competition intensity. At sufficiently low and high competition,
patent strength does not affect second period scientist return. Thus, the entrepreneur’s
second period loss or wage reduction due to patenting is unaffected, rendering the increase
in first period wage superfluous and profit reducing. Further, constant second period
scientist return combined with increased first period wage induce an increase in total R&D
expenditure at low and high levels of competition intensity. At moderate intensity of
competition, while the increase in first period wage generates a mitigating (augmenting)
effect on total profitability (R&D expenditure) of the innovation, an increase in expected
recovery additionally increases (decreases) the second period earning of the entrepreneur
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(scientist) through higher potential for recovery from patenting. However, in contrast to the
main analysis, the first period wage adjustment is not exact due to imperfect information
regarding second period intensity of competition. As a result, the opposing effects of a
stricter patent rule on profit and R&D expenditure at moderate levels of competition
intensity render the combined effect ambiguous.
Relaxing Assumption 2b
We relax Assumption 2b to suppose L
2vσ
2(L2+1)
< c < L
2vσ
(1+σ)L2+2σ
. It implies θ1 < θ4 < θ2. In
Figure 3, this corresponds to the range σ ∈ (σB, σA). Figure B.1 illustrates the second
period equilibrium patenting and movement behavior when Assumption 2b does not hold.
The difference with the main analysis is the absence of patenting at some low and moderately
low levels of competition intensity due to insufficient loss and wage reduction, respectively
from patenting. However, notice that while at low competition intensity the entrepreneur
never patents the innovation, as competition intensity increases patenting occurs, ceasing
again as it exceeds a threshold level, implying a non-monotone relation of patenting with
competition intensity. Alternatively, a change in the relative magnitudes of regime strength
and patenting cost does not affect movement, implying a monotone relation of the same
with the intensity of competition. Thus, relaxing Assumption 2b preserves the results
in Proposition 1. Lemma 1 & Lemma 2 in the main analysis give the expressions for
realized profit and R&D expenditure, respectively. Using the corresponding movement and
patenting behavior for the new ranges of θ in Figure B.1, it can be easily checked that (i)
profit falls with an increase in competition intensity in the first range of θ, i.e. 0 < θ < θ1,
and rises henceforth, with discontinuities at θ4 and θ3 due to reversal of patenting behavior,
and (ii) R&D expenditure rises with an increase in competition intensity in 0 < θ < θ1 and
remains constant henceforth. It follows, the non-monotone relation of competition intensity
with total profitability and R&D expenditure of the innovation defined in Proposition 2
remain unaltered when we relax Assumption 2b.
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Figure B.1: Patenting and mobility by competition intensity (without Assumption 2.b)
Figure 3 suggests Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 hold in the range σ ∈ (σB, σA), implying the
relevant ranges of θ remain qualitatively unchanged as σ increases. Lemma 1 implies no
change in profit within any range of θ, which conforms to the main analysis. However,
the lower threshold determining a reversal of patenting behavior falls as σ rises, causing
incidence of patenting to increase and profit to fall in moderate values of competition
intensity. On the other hand, in contrast to the main analysis, Lemma 2 implies no
change in R&D expenditure within any range of θ as the current range of σ precludes
patenting when movement occurs. As recovery proportion affects R&D expenditure only
when patenting and movement occur simultaneously, it turns out an increase in σ has no
effect on R&D expenditure of the innovation at any level of competition intensity. Therefore,
while the results in Corollary 2 and Proposition 3 hold without Assumption 2b, the effect
in Proposition 4 manifests only when the assumption holds.
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Appendix C
Supply Schedule Model of Competition Intensity
The model of competition exactly follows Menezes and Quiggin (2012). Consider n
symmetric firms with marginal cost k1 = k2 = ... = kn = k < 1. The linear demand
function is:
p = 1− [q1 + q2 + ...+ qn]








where αi is the choice variable denoting position of the supply function and β ≥ 0 is an
exogenous parameter characterizing intensity of competition. We get the profit expression
from Menezes and Quiggin (2012) as:
π∗ =
(1 + β(n− 1))(1− k)2
[(n+ 1) + nβ(n− 1)]2
Substitute n = 1 to get the monopoly profit of the entrepreneur, n = 2 to get duopoly
returns in case the rival appears in equilibrium, and replace the first expression into the





(1− λ)ρi = ρe =




5 + 4β2 + 8β
(3 + 2β)2
;
This framework does not consider technology diffusion through market expansion due
to appearance of the rival in the second period. To derive the second period optimal
patenting and movement behavior, first suppose ρe > λρi =⇒ (1 + 2β)
2 < 0. However,
this can never hold as β > 0. It implies, the present framework rules out the possibility
of movement in equilibrium. This is because the sum of the two duopoly profits in the
second period in case movement occurs can never exceed the monopoly profit, implying
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ρi ≥ ρe + (1 − λ)ρi =⇒ λρi ≥ ρe. Therefore, in absence of market expansion due to
arrival of a rival, the loss to the entrepreneur from market competition always exceeds the
potential gain to the scientist from moving, rendering it profitable for the entrepreneur to
retain the scientist.
Next, suppose σλρi < ρe ≤ λρi. We already established the second part of the inequality
for all β > 0. The first part holds if σ < 4+β
5+4β2+8β
. The entrepreneur retains the scientist in
this case, and patents the innovation if σλρi ≥ c =⇒ σ ≥
4c(3+2β)2
(5+4β2+8β)(1−k)2
, where c is the
cost of patenting.




The first part implies (1+β)(1−k)
2
(3+2β)2
> 0, which always holds. In this case, the scientist optimally




As ρe > 0 for all β > 0, the scientist never finds movement to the non-R&D sector profitable
in absence of equilibrium patenting.
Summarizing, we have ρe ≤ λρi always holds. σλρi R ρe according as σ R 4+β5+4β2+8β . Notice
that as β rises, the RHS of the inequality falls. Hence, starting from an initial β such
that σ < 4+β
5+4β2+8β
for a given σ, as β increases, σ eventually equals and then exceeds
4+β
5+4β2+8β
. Figure C.1 plots the second period equilibrium patenting and movement at
different levels of β. Check that ∂λ
∂β
> 0 and ∂
2λ
∂β2
< 0. ρi is constant with respect to β.
Thus, the graphs for λρi and σλρi are increasing and concave over β, with σλρi being a
downward shift of λρi by a proportion (1−σ) at a given β, as in our main analysis. Further,












β4, β2 and β3 in Figure C.1 correspond to θ4, θ2 and θ3, respectively from the main analysis
(without Assumption 2b). Therefore, equilibrium patenting behavior has a non-monotone
relation to competition intensity, and the nature of the relation is exactly similar to our
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Figure C.1: Patenting and mobility by competition intensity
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